The initial question, about the use of the concept 'analog', puts me in mind of a book recently published by Bernd Ullmann, "Analog Computing".  I haven't had an opportunity to finish reading it but I do recall Bernd offering the two concepts not as an either/or choice but as alternative perspectives.  

I've visited Bernd in Bad Schwalbach, and his collection of analog (by circuit construction) computers is impressive to the point of overwhelming.  And they work!  -- Ian 

On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Paul Fishwick <metaphorz@gmail.com> wrote:
@Willard: Care’s argument seems compelling and your characterization feels accurate to me. The term
“analog”, unfortunately, has transformed into the opposite of digital. Your “continuity of practice” (modelling)
seems more relevant and enriching. One of the side of effects of our current condition in computer science, 
is that the analog is ignored in CS education. History also tends to be ignored, which is a related and more 
acute problem.  

@Ben: I enjoyed reading Sterne’s essay. I especially like the point made in the last paragraph:
“technology is a part of the domain of human existence, not something outside it.” This is as true today
as it was when we first fashioned sticks out of branches and used bones for information (e.g., Ishango bone).

A significant issue is that computing is taught and generally viewed as something happening in a box. If we
can learn from the mathematicians, computing can be viewed as an intensely human activity similar to how
we can view the world through the lens of set theory. This issue, I believe, is related to the analog computing 
discussion since it is a short transition from the analog to seeing computing everywhere. If we limit our understanding
of computing to the digital, it is quite literally difficult to leap out of the box.

-p




On Nov 7, 2014, at 10:47 AM, Ben Peters <bjpeters@gmail.com> wrote:

Thanks, Paul, for the fascinating prompt.  

I'm excited to hear about the literature suggested by Willard, and I particularly like your distinction between analog as what is not discrete and analog as isomorphism (e.g. Douglas Hoftstadter's most recent book). Those interested may also be interested in the media philosopher and sound historian Jonathan Sterne's take on the question, which resonates fairly well with your distinction and Willard's comments on the midcentury timing. 

If interested, check out this short essay draft Sterne wrote on "analog" that I am editing for a forthcoming volume (currently under review at Princeton), and that at least one other on this list are contributing to (*head nod toward Bernie*). Sterne develops more extended arguments in his books on the MP3 and sound recording, and I could if asked point to more tangential digital-analog debate in sound studies. 

Running out the door, 

Ben  


On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 9:22 AM, Paul Fishwick <metaphorz@gmail.com> wrote:
I recently had a discussion about analog computing with someone who works actively on
hybrid analog-digital systems at the integrated circuit level. My proposal was that there seems
to be, based on historical accounts and reflection, two differing views on “analog”: 1) analog
reflecting the continuous or discrete character of magnitude of a variable, and 2) isomorphism
indicated by construing analog to be associated closely with analogy.

To take one example which can serve for discussion: Are Minecraft circuits analog, digital, or
both? It depends on how we define “analog” and where we focus (on the issue of representation
or magnitude). For example, redstone circuits could be viewed as analog computing in the sense
that the circuits are analogous to electronic circuits containing gates such as and, or, xor, etc.
And yet, at the bottom of the vast hierarchy of translation, we have Minecraft servers and clients
working on top of a digital substrate. In the mid 90s, I bought a Nord Lead for my synthesizer
collection, and Nord uses “virtual analog” to characterize their lineup (an analog front end
and a digital back end):


My view is that the issue of magnitude is a side-effect of “analog as analogy and, thus,
isomorphism", and thus not primary. Tangible objects when juxtaposed and configured together
to form physical analogies happen to be continuous simply because reality and our physiology
is continuous, and we employ real objects (at least in the mind) when forming analogies. This
view may need tweaking, but it seems as though the knowledge of such things is present in
this forum.

What are the thoughts on this? Is this an ongoing point of debate among historians?

-paul


Paul Fishwick, PhD
Chair, ACM SIGSIM
Distinguished University Chair of Arts & Technology 
   and Professor of Computer Science
Director, Creative Automata Laboratory
The University of Texas at Dallas
Arts & Technology
800 West Campbell Road, AT10
Richardson, TX 75080-3021


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This email is relayed from members@sigcis.org, the email discussion list of SHOT SIGCIS. Opinions expressed here are those of the member posting and are not reviewed, edited, or endorsed by SIGCIS. The list archives are at http://sigcis.org/pipermail/members/ and you can change your subscription options at http://sigcis.org/mailman/listinfo/members


Paul Fishwick, PhD
Chair, ACM SIGSIM
Distinguished University Chair of Arts & Technology 
   and Professor of Computer Science
Director, Creative Automata Laboratory
The University of Texas at Dallas
Arts & Technology
800 West Campbell Road, AT10
Richardson, TX 75080-3021


_______________________________________________
This email is relayed from members@sigcis.org, the email discussion list of SHOT SIGCIS. Opinions expressed here are those of the member posting and are not reviewed, edited, or endorsed by SIGCIS. The list archives are at http://sigcis.org/pipermail/members/ and you can change your subscription options at http://sigcis.org/mailman/listinfo/members



--
Ian S. King, MSIS, MSCS
Ph.D. Candidate
The Information School
University of Washington

An optimist sees a glass half full. A pessimist sees it half empty. An engineer sees it twice as large as it needs to be.